Comments on: The Taiwan Arms Sale

By: Progress in the Taiwan Strait – Daniel Michaeli: Asia Ruminations

Progress in the Taiwan Strait – Daniel Michaeli: Asia Ruminations — Thu, 01 Jul 2010 17:02:59 +0000

[...] people must feel the island is not overly dependent on China and that their leaders make decisions free of pressure from the mainland. To this end, China should stop interfering in Taiwan’s free trade negotiations with other [...]

By: Give Up the 2006 Futenma Agreement: There’s More to the U.S.-Japan Alliance – Daniel Michaeli: Asia Ruminations

Mon, 10 May 2010 15:18:39 +0000

[...] more than anything else, strategic rather than tactical. Japan–and, for that matter, Taiwan (as I noted here)–are able to develop closer ties with mainland China because they understand the United [...]

By: Kevin Slaten

Kevin Slaten — Tue, 09 Feb 2010 00:37:52 +0000

Hey Dan,

On your Taiwan politics points:

1 re: I agree that it is politically advantageous to demonstrate the priority of security, but this still ignores the fact that the ECFA could have been inked first. The ECFA doesn’t disclude the arms.

2 re: Just over half of the public already supports the ECFA. There was little need for the arms to bolster this. Moreover, Ma doesn’t need to have anything passed, technically, by the LY. If he wants to show administrative competence, then he will update them frequently, as he’s been doing. But there will be no vote of the ECFA. (Despite DPP calls for the vote.)

3 re: Agreed. But I’m not talking about DPP support. I’m talking about support of those people who roll from DPP to KMT — the “independents”. Come next election, wouldn’t the KMT want “Ma is tough on security” fresh on their minds rather than “Ma is intertwining us with the Mainland”?

By: Daniel Michaeli

Daniel Michaeli — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 19:12:24 +0000

Kevin, I don’t think Ma took as much of a risk as you might think. It is true that he had no way of being certain of how the Chinese would respond. But to the extent that the Chinese government would still far prefer to see the KMT in power, I don’t think the ECFA was ever really too much at risk. Also, as one could have predicted (based on lessons learned from the mid-1990s), China is now much more careful about trying to influence events in Taiwan by flexing its muscles–another reason China is continuing to negotiate the ECFA regardless of the arms sale.

On domestic opinion in Taiwan, I have a few quick points. 1) Providing for Taiwan’s security is a politically savvy move, and one more likely to bring electoral gains than a longer-term economic agreement with China. 2) The public will support the China-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement only if it is assured of Taiwan’s security; reassuring Taiwan first makes it easier to rally support for ECFA in the Legislative Yuan and harder for the DPP to argue that ECFA is harming Taiwan’s security. 3) The DPP will run against ECFA regardless of its progress, because many in Taiwan are worried about what the agreement will mean. Why would Ma give the DPP another advantage on security, too?

By: Kevin Slaten

Kevin Slaten — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:43:40 +0000

I appreciate your perspective, Dan. Though it may surprise you, I may even agree. I do not think that our views are necessarily irreconcilable. You seemed to have misunderstood my argument. I was focusing specifically on the timing of the deal, not the security balance.

Arms to Taiwan changes little in the regional balance of power, as you know. But I still think that it was a risk by Ma Ying-jeou to go through with this now. Or perhaps you could say that it was inconsiderate of Obama to force Ma to deal with this right now. Over simplified, my argument is: 1) ink the ECFA, then 2) sell the arms, if need be.

Even from a domestic political view, the current order of events is no good. Ma might get a boost from the arms now, but then he’ll get railed for the ECFA. For the sake of his parties electoral outcomes, he might have been wiser to reverse the order, thus getting a positive bump going into next year’s elections.