The problem is that, for the relationship to mature, India and the U.S. will need to find ways of working together better where interests do align. (This includes the Afghanistan/Pakistan issue.) As part of this, ideally Indian domestic politics won’t be the impediment that it is now in many areas. In Copenhagen, for instance, much of the specific disagreement with India was not on the basic structure of how an agreement should look; it had to do with Indian concerns about not wanting to allow the West to scrutinize the results of climate measures it was already offering to adopt.

I don’t hold the U.S. blameless, by any means. In the run-up to Copenhagen, for instance, America devoted far less attention to India than to China, suggesting that the administration does not prioritize U.S.-India bilateral cooperation as it should.

My fundamental concern is if the U.S. and India don’t develop habits of cooperation now, and if the Indian public is not supportive of a comprehensive bilateral relationship, the potential for cooperation will always be limited, even as more interests do come into alignment. This is why making an argument based almost entirely on national interests is, I believe, missing much of the picture.

On trade and climate, India’s interests are very much those of a developing country, with 60% of the population engaged in agriculture (explaining being at loggerheads with the US at Doha) and 45% extremely poor (making it hard to accept legally binding emission cuts).

On Iran, while India does not support sanctions against it, it did vote against it at three IAEA resolutions between 2005 and 2009. These were significant moves for India, which has had warm relations with Iran since the heydays of nonalignment. In fact, this vote was criticized in many quarters as a test set up by the US for India during the nuke deal negotiations.

Also, the unwillingness to have a closer relationship is reciprocated by the US on an issue like Afghanistan. Both countries have a convergence of interest there, with India even more leery of any reconciliation with the Taliban (it was the only country to express dissent against negotiation with the Taliban at the recent London Conference). While it is unlikely to send troops there, it could have contributed to US efforts by supplying military trainers. But the idea was shot down during the US strategy review because of Pakistan’s apprehensions.

Finally, I take the point that there is a reflexive distrust of US geopolitical motives in certain Indian political circles. It was a significant political cost during the nuke deal negotiations as well. But it does not explain the divergence between India and the US on many issues. Divergence of interests does.